Decision-Making Process of Chinas Economic Sanctions

Decision-Making bring of chinas frugal SanctionsIt is undoubtedly that the rest of the world argon increasely come to of chinas sparing violence and how leave mainland China intend to exercising the power to advance geo governmental ends. China has enjoyed rapid stinting gain since the portal of market reforms in 1978. The unprecedented stinting growth has made China becoming the second biggest prudence in the world in the division 2010. non precisely did Chinas scotch power improves, the signifi female genital organt frugalal growth has to a fault provided China with greater opportunity and strength to increase political influence abroad finished stintingal means, so called sparingalal discreetness. at present economic e allegecraft has change state an ever much than evident peculiarity of Chinas behavior in the international system, as the level of interdependence between China and the global economic grows.To define economic statecraft more clearly, this study will rely on Baldwins (1985) definition. Baldwin defines economic statecraft as the occasion of economic levers by states attempting to influence early(a) international actors through offering economic incentives or imposing damaging supports1. In opposite words, economic statecraft is divided into positive incentives and blackball incites, and these will form in the forms of trade and capital. For shell, positive incentives in the form of trade argon favorable tariff discrimination and trade subsidies, firearm capital incentives in the form of capital ar foreign aid and investment guarantees. Examples of negative sanctions in the form of trade argon embargo, boycott, and unfavorable tariff discrimination, mend sanctions in the form of capital ar aid suspension, freezing assets and pecuniary control.Chinese leaders generally prefer carrots over sticks, as economic incentives provide mutual advantages to about(prenominal) economies and thus resulting in a win-win outcome. Examples are Chinas foreign aid activities in developing countries and Chinas free trade apprehension with other countries, which both cuttings non totally enable China to confirm its relationship with other countries but excessively al low-down both countries to benefit economically. While the use of economic sanctions by China has been rather exalted, which is not a surprising phenomenon. This is because China has a keen-sighted-standing stance on the opposition of economic sanction2. It opposes sanctions as a way of resolving issues and condemns sanctions as an riotous penalizement of vulnerable and the innocent populations. Chinas opposition is demonst con alignrd through discharge Chinese leaders publicly criticized other countries for imposing economic sanctions to punish wrongdoers. One example is that a Chinese foreign ministry official, Jiang Yu responded to the Frenchs call for considerable sanctions against Iran to cease its nuclear program in 2009, China always believes that sanctions a pressure should not be an option and will not be conducive to the current diplomatic efforts over the Iran nuclear issues.3 Another example is that the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi opposes sanctions on North Korea and expressed his view to the Nipponese counterpart that uni subsequentlyal sanctions were not the solely answer to managing the situation on the Korean Peninsula and it would not resolve the nuclear issue of North Korea4. These devil examples reflect Chinas belief of inefficacy of sanctions.Besides public critics of sanctions, China had overly use its Security Council veto to oppose against sanctions on countries including Myanmar in 2007, Zimbabwe in 2008, Syria in 2011 and 2012. Not only did Beijing thinks sanction is in efficacious, but it besides think sanction discharge inflict injury to the tush realms economy and the living of its people5. Beijing has repeatedly insisted that peaceful means should be em ployed as the priority option to resolve conflict, while sanction should only be used as a defy resort6. Indeed Chinas opposition stance on sanctions is consistent with its commitment to peaceful instruction and its credit line as a responsible power. Chinas peaceful training has been the central idea of Chinese foreign insurance since 2004. Beijing sees peaceful instruction as crucial to preserve a peaceful environment for sustaining its economic development and stability. In other words, China advocates a world with peace and harmony, in which all countries are benefiting from the shared prosperity. China also has been working towards to take its image as a responsible power to mitigate Chinas panic theory through proactively involve in international affairs.Despite Beijings long standing negative perception of economic sanctions, in that respect is a trend of China increasingly marque use of economic obsession in the international arena, which marks a new and signifi cant phenomenon that contradicts with Chinas rhetoric and its long-standing stance. This is certify in the quartet lawsuits that will be further explored in the later chapters. The first case is Chinas proposed economic sanctions on USs companies that engages in arms dispense to Taiwan in 2010. The second case is Chinas imports ban of crude soy oil from Argentina as a retaliation in receipt to Sino-Argentina tension in 2010. The third case is where China imposed an merchandise ban of rare-earth on Japan in face of the Sino-Japanese tension in the disputed maritime island in 2010. The last case is Chinas restriction on Philippiness imported bananas following the Scarborough Shoal incident in 2012.These cases indicate the increasing propensity of China to exercise economic coercions. The question presents here is that provided Chinas negative perception of economic sanction, why China still imposes economic sanction on other countries as a whoreson of economic statecraft? Wha t are the decision process driving China to exercise economic sanctions? What are the characteristics of Chinese economic sanctions?It is also worth noting that majority of the animate literary productions on Chinese economic statecraft focuses on the effectuate and efficacy of Chinese economic statecraft rather than on its motives and application. Because examples of Chinese economic coercion are relatively limited and understudied, an in-depth depth psychology of Chinas economic sanction is vital to understand the decision making process and what triggers China to resort to coercion especially in recent years. This study also further seek to explain how Chinas exercise of economic sanction fits into Chinas fantastic policy? This story builds on Chinas economic statecraft literature specifically Chinese economic sanction in the field of external policy-making economy (IPE) by drawing key definition and concepts from influential works.1. Economic Sanctions and its effectivenes sAs discussed in Chapter 1, economic sanctions are stemming from economic statecraft. Daniel Drezner (2003) defines economic coercion as the threat or act by a sender government to disrupt economic ex alternate with the bulls eye state, unless the pose acquiesces to articulated demand.7 Many scholars admit used sender to refer to the state that imposes the sanction, while target means the sanctioned countries. However it is noted that numerous studies today sacrifice used the term economic coercion and economic statecraft interchangeably scorn that they are different8. To align with the current studies, this paper will treat these two terms as equivalent. There two major weaknesses with this definition. First, Drezners definition of sanction is too restrictive. It only views the behavioral change as the only desired outcome of sanctions by the sender, which in this case is the acquiescence to the senders demand. However, sanctions can also have outcomes such as type and deter rence. Second, the definition limits itself to only one desired outcome by the sender. In fact, senders are able to strike more than one outcome on the target by imposing sanctions.Lindsay and Giumelli demonst grade that economic sanctions can achieve outcomes other than behavioral change and hold multiple goals. Lindsay claims that sanction can take up to five different actions including compliance, subversion, deterrence, international symbolism, or national symbolism9. Giumelli also defines three dimension that sanction can take, which are coercion, reserve and signal10. For the purpose of this paper, I will utilize Giumellis three means of economic sanction to evaluate my open unsettleds in Chapter 3.Most existing literature on economic sanctions focus on measuring the succeederful rate of economic sanctions. While the majority of literature in the 1970s and eighties saw the low successful rate of economic sanction, many scholars think economic sanction to be ineffective. The study conducted by Hufbauer, Schott and Elloitt is one of the first to challenge the negative perception and finds that 34 percent of cases in economic sanctions were successful in the twentieth century11. However, the findings has later been contested by other scholars. Scholar like Robert Pape re-conducted the study using the homogeneous dataset, yet he finds less than 5 percent of sanctions had succeeded and concludes their study inflated the success rate12.On the other hand, Drezner holds an opposite view than Paper where he asserts that success rate is potentially undervalued as a result of selection biases13. He argues that there were many cases where economic coercion ended at the threat manakin rather than the impositions phase. These cases show greater ascertains of succeeding than when they are imposed callable to change of pre-emptive behavior. Since Hufbauer et al. select those cases that are less likely to succeed when sanctions are imposed, Drezner argues that they downplays the role of hidden hand of economic coercion and hence the success rate is far higher.These researches share the common weakness in which they have solely depended on the behavioral change criterion to gauge the prosperity of economic sanction. This problem is exactly the same as the definition earlier. Without winning into account other effects of economic sanction, the effectiveness of sanction cannot be measured. This raises a question if really economic sanctions are proved to be so unsuccessful in formula, why policymakers still depended on it for its state governance? Not to mention that today there is still no consensus reached as to the degree of success of economic sanctions. This is because of a lack of a shared model for the study of successful sanctions. However, in general scholars learn on that a successful economic sanctions is to keep the target be of deadlock and potential vulnerabilities large while having the cost of imposing small. For instan ce, Hufbauer et al. in its 3rd book edition advise that policymakers require to evaluate both the vulnerability of the target country to prospective sanctions and the viability of maintaining the sanctions regime14. Drezner in his book the sanctions problem illustrates the importance to enlarge the gap in the costs of sanctions impositions, meaning to maximize the targets costs of noncompliance and minify the senders costs of imposition15. Beside this, he also argues that the low expectation of future conflict between the sender and target will make sanctions more likely to succeed. His argument has proven to explain why allies are more likely to take bigger concession than the case with adversaries.It is worthy to note that the tools of economic sanctions are increasingly effective today than a decade ago, with improving abilities to enlarge the costs of targets while limit the senders costs. Smart or targeted sanction is one of them, where it was first introduced in 1990s. Smart sanctions are different to comprehensive sanctions in that they impose sanctions by targeting an individual or limited sectors compared to targeting the whole country16. By doing so, smart sanctions are able to effectively increase the costs in that group while reduce the humanitarian effects on the target countrys population and turbulent economic impacts to other sectors.crooked interdependence is another major tool that has been increasingly used by policymakers. Hirschman demonstrates that asymmetry interdependence serves as a source of power to the stronger and larger states as they have the arbitrary leverage over the weaker and smaller states, with the smaller states are depended on the economy of the larger state17. Building on the concepts of Hirschman, Robert Keohane argues that asymmetric interference can also withstand to weaker states provided that they have the asymmetric advantage in certain groups of the stronger states18. This thinking has challenged the sea ca ptain idea of asymmetry and provide explanation of why would weaker states impose sanctions on stronger states. Undoubtedly, the recent evolution of sanction tools stemming from the classical ones has increased the proliferation of the use economic sanctions.2. Chinese economic sanctionsFew scholars have commented on Chinas economic sanctions, and micro remains to be found in the literature on this topic. This is precisely because, strictly speaking, China does not formally impose economic sanctions unilaterally on other countries. Instead, China pursues other economic maneuvers that essentially have the same effect. To remain politically correct and technically accurate though, scholars use the term economic coercion to describe Chinas behaviour. Despite sharing the same objectives, economic sanctions mainly used by rich western countries and economic coercion have its own defining characteristics. Specifically, Chinas use of economic coercion is informal and indirect19. The Ch inese government would never declare the true ground for the economic restrictions. Instead, other unrelated reasons are cited, leaving the target country to connect the dots themselves.Some scholars are starting to believe that Chinas longstanding practice of shunning economic sanctions will soon come to an end. Beijing has become increasingly reliant on economic coercion to solicit policy change or as a means to send a message20. As the number and degree of tensions escalate, economic coercion may not be adequate. Chinas growing economic clout is another alarming development for some. With greater power, some scholars fear that China would be more habituated to use what is readily available at their disposal.On the opposite side of the argument, scholars believe that China would continue its limited use of economic policies as a tool. The argument goes like this Economic coercion or sanctions are detrimental to Chinas core national interests21. In particular, Beijing places great tension on peaceful development and creating a good international image. magisterial sanctions or coercion on other countries can seriously pervert that objective. Moreover, the stringent rules of the WTO greatly restricts the range of options that is available to Beijing. Pursuing an aggressive economic coercion strategy puts undue risks of violating WTO rules and damaging the countrys economic health.1. Hypotheses subsequently the analysis of literature review of economic sanctions, the following hypotheses are made to lead the research question why China imposes economic sanctions? What trigger the use of economic sanctions? What are the distinctive characteristics of Chineses economic coercion?H1 China exercises economic sanction on non-allied countries when they harm Chinas national interest provided that the gain derived from sanction outweigh the cost.This supposition is built on the foundation of Drezners Sanction problem theory, which argues that sanctioning states a re more likely to sanction adversaries than allies despite a lower success rate. The adversaries would take a larger concessions if target incurs significant more costs than senders costs. Since China views economic sanction as a last resort of resolving conflict, China will only imposes coercion when its core interest is infringed. In this case, the independent variable is equipment casualty or no damage to Chinas national security, while the dependent variable is the use of sanction.H2 China uses economic sanction where there is a sectorial asymmetric economic advantage over the target countryAsymmetric economic advantage allows China to have a higher chance of success in achieving its political goals in target countries with limited costs. This hypothesis also considers the importance of smart sanction for Chinas decision to impose sanction. In specific, asymmetric economic advantage in a certain sectors offers coercive leverage and source of power to contest against equally stro ng or stronger countries. China takes advantage of the sectorial asymmetric advantage not only can generate the most optimal benefit-cost outcome but also minimize negative impacts on the whole economy and humanitarian impacts on the population. Independent variable is economic sanctions with sectorial asymmetric economic advantage, and dependent variable is the use of economic coercion.H3 China uses implicit economic sanctions as its prioritized option and uses explicit economic sanction as a last resort Implicit economic sanction indicates sanctions in a non-declared and private settings. The implicit feature of economic sanctions allows China to gain flexibility and minimize diplomatic fallout. It also allows China to reveal a relatively more consistent image of a responsible power that advocates peaceful development and peaceful resolution. China will only adopt explicit economic sanctions if implicit sanctions cannot work. The independent variable in this hypothesis is implici t economic sanction, and dependent variable is the use of economic sanction.3. Case StudiesIn influence to examine the validity of these three hypotheses that together contribute to reasons why China uses economic sanctions. This study explores four-spot case studies where China imposed economic sanctions against four different countries, which are the 2010 Sino-Taiwan arms war, the 2010 Sino-Argentina crude soy oil, the 2010 Sino-Japan rare earth war, and the 2012 Sino-Philippine banana war. In order to reduce the selection and in the flesh(predicate) biases, this study compares four case studies and identifies the similarities and differences between these studies.On top of that, vicenary measures is also adopted. In detail, the monetary costs of both the sender and target countries, the time period of the target countrys response to Chinas sanctions, as well as the impact of the sanction on the countrys economy are measured. Given that these four cases are all trade sanctions , trade statistics are collected from fall in Nations Commodity Trade Statistics (UN Comrade). These statistical results will also be contrasted single and is subsequently review together with the qualitative results. Even though the numerical measures are not used to measure the effectiveness of Chinese coercion levers, they provide insights on the rationale why China employs these levers. The result can also confirm Chinas implementation of implicit economic coercions, as some may argue that Chinas moves are not economic sanction where they are independent of those incidents.Timeline/schedule for the thesisJanuaryAmend and Complete literature polish up and methodology chaptersResearch and examine the current literature on the four case studiesFebruaryAnalysis of the qualitative analysis of four case studies and make comparison between the fourConduct quantifiable analysis of the case studies and make comparisonMarchInterpretation of the results from both qualitative and quant itative analysis and make conclusionAprilFinal submission1 Baldwin David, Economic finesse (New Jersey Princeton UP, 1985), 40-42.2 James Reilly, Chinas Unilateral Sanctions, The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2012) 121-133.3 Willem V. Kemenade, China vs. the Western Campaign for Iran Sanction, The Washington Quarterly 33, no. 3 (2010) 99-114.4 Huileng Tan, China tells Japan sanctions against North Korea wont resolve nuclear issue, CNBN, family line 14, 2016, http//www.cnbc.com/2016/09/14/china-tells-japan-sanctions-against-north-korea-wont-resolve-nuclear-issue.html (accessed December 8, 2016)5 Mu Ren, Chinas Non-intervention Policy in UNSC Sanctions in the 21st one C The Cases of Libya, North Korea, and Zimbabwe, Ritsumeikan International Affairs 12, (2014)101-1346 Ibid.7 Daniel W Drezner, The Hidden present of Economic Coercion, International Organization 57, no. 3 (2003) 643-659.8 Baldwin David, Economic delicacy (New Jersey Princeton UP, 1985)9 James M Lindsay, Trade Sanc tions As Policy Instruments A Re-Examination, International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1986) 153-17310 Francesco Giumelli, Coercing, Constraining and Signalling Explaining UN and EU Sanctions After the Cold War (Colchester ECPR Press, 2011), 311 Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly A. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered Supplemental Case Histories, (Washington, D.C. base for International Economics, 1990)12 Robert A Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work, International Security 23, no.1 (1998) 66.13 Daniel W Drezner, The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion, International Organization 57, no. 3 (2003) 643-659.14 Gary C. Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly A. Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered Supplemental Case Histories, (Washington, D.C. name for International Economics, 2009), 69015 Daniel W Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox Economic Statecraft and International Relations, (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1316 Daniel W Drezner, Sanctions Sometimes Smart Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice, International Studies reappraisal 2011, no. 13 (2011) 96-10817 Albert Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade,(Berkeley University of calcium Press, 1980).18 Robert Keohane, and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence, 238-240.19 James Reilly, Chinas Unilateral Sanctions, The Washington Quarterly 35, no. 4 (2012) 121-133.20 Bonnie Glaser, Chinas Coercive Economic Diplomacy A New and sorry Trend,CSIS, August 6, 2012, https//www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-coercive-economic-diplomacy-new-and-worrying-trend, (Accessed on 11 December 2016)21 Jianwei, Liu. Is china an appear sanctioning state? Cooperation for a Peaceful and Sustainable World sort out 2, 2013, 225-240.